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Abstract: 
    E-Commerce challenges traditional approaches to assessing monopolistic practices 
due to the rapid rate of growth, rapid change in technology, difficulty in assessing market 
share for information products like web sites, and high degree of interconnectivity and 
alliance formation among corporations. This paper has provided a fundamental 
framework that integrates a network and economic perspective to understand IT markets. 
This framework was applied to the search engine market. We study critical characteristics 
of the search engine market, including major players, search techniques, network 
structure, and market structure and try to assess whether any search engines have 
monopoly power given that advertising price in the search engine market is not easily 
attained and that no price is charged from users for most services provided by search 
engines. 
    We focus on major search engines that provide general search services. We assume 
that the top 19 search engines in the June 2000 rating from Nielsen/NetRatings account 
for 100 % market share. We collected data on the hyperlinks connecting these search 
engine web sites over a five-month period from August 12th 2000 to Dec. 12th 2000. Each 
month’s network was stored as a binary matrix. By analyzing these matrices, we found 
that the degree of centrality has increased on average from August to December, although 
the trend is not monotonic. There is also a fairly high degree of variance, regardless of the 
centrality measure used. This indicates that there is an unequal distribution of power in 
this industry. 
   We also apply three additional concepts: concentration, product differentiation, and 
entry barriers to describe the market structure of the search engines. These are important 
measures used by the Department of Justice to evaluate markets. The findings indicate 
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that (1) despite an increasing number of search engines, barriers to entry seem high, 
largely due to the exponential growth in the number of web sites and the non-scalability 
of the current search technology and collective switching costs; (2) older search engine 
sites tend typically to have more features to lock in users. Using standard economic 
indicators (CR4=58% and HHI=1163), the industry looks close to being plagued by 
anticompetitive practices. However, based on a network adjusted HHI (NAHHI) 
constructed in this paper, its value, 870, suggests that there is less cause for concern.  
    To date, no search techniques are able to cover the whole web. Estimates suggest 
that the most comprehensive search engines are covering less than half of the sites in 
2000. The number of sites is increasing faster than the number of sites searched. If this 
continues, and if the number of search engines decreases, then likely results are 
information distortion, loss of social welfare, and loss of economic value for sites not 
covered by the search engines. If there were to be only a few search engine sites, who are 
they likely to be? Based on all indicators, it suggests that Yahoo would be a contender. 
Other possible contenders are MSN and Netscape. On the basis of results to date, some 
search engines keep increasing their audience reach while others don’t. The trend shows 
that some search engines may dominate the search engine market. We suggest conducting 
research in the coverage performance of search engines and investigate “information 
search cost” as a performance indicator of search techniques. In addition, we suggest 
paying attention to any anticompetitive conduct (e.g. product bundling) that may lesson 
competition and reduce consumer welfare. The combination of network theory and 
economic theory to study the search engine market, used in this paper, is a particularly 
powerful approach for E-Commerce.  
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Introduction: 
    According to a report by Cyveillance (2000), as of June 2000, there were 2.1 billion 
indexable pages1 on the web. By Jan. 2001, 4 billion pages are expected. People find 
web pages via search engines (Nielsen Study, 1997; Ernst & Young, 1998; GVU, 1998; 
NetRatings, 1999; IMT Strategies, 2000), web sites that assist Internet users to locate 
other web sites (domain names) or pages (Uniform Resource Locator, URL). Smith, 
Bailey, and Brynjolfsson (1999) observed that the search cost for individual users 
increases due to the sheer volume of information. Search engines help users reduce 
search costs to find web pages. Therefore, search engines are the “portals” to the rest of 
the Web and thus attract high hit rates. Of the top 10 web sites studied by MediaMetrix 
(2000), nine provide general search services2.  
    Establishing a web site on the Internet is very easy; however, not every site gains 
equal attention. Adamic and Huberman (1999) in a study of log files from AOL found 
that the top 5 % of sites attract 75 % of the users. Hence, a small number of sites 
command the traffic of a large segment of the web population. This is a characteristic of 
winner-take-all markets (Frank and Cook, 1995). According to a study in June 2000 from 
Neilsen/NetRatings3, Yahoo had 47 % of audience reach4, which means 47 % of the 
survey participants had been to the Yahoo web site during the survey period. After Yahoo, 
MSN, Go, and Netscape had 35 %, 19 %, and 15 % audience reach, respectively5. These 
numbers indicate high concentration as defined by audience reach. They also showed that 
Yahoo and MSN have continuously increased their audience reach while most other 
search engines have decreased. If the Web is a winner-take-all market, then some web 
sites will dominate the market. To date, some of the search engines have gained high hit 
rates (Nielsen/NetRatings, 2000) and may dominate the market. Do search engines have 
monopoly power? 
    Monopoly power is a key factor in antitrust cases. However, antitrust related issues 
on the Web have not gained significant attention. Rather, attention has been focused on 
issues such as pricing, trust, and loyalty (Bailey, 1998; Kollock, 1999; Telang, 
Mukhopadhyay, and Wilcox, 2000). Sheremata (1998) stated that antitrust policy and 
enforcement in information technology (IT) industries appear to be difficult. The 
dynamics of competition and industrial organization in these industries are difficult to 
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understand, due to the special nature of the new economy and to the scarcity of research 
about the IT industries (Sheremata, 1998). The Microsoft antitrust case has caused many 
discussions about the characteristics and conduct of these industries as well as debates 
over antitrust policies and remedies in the IT industries. Nevertheless, the nature of 
competition on the Web is still not clearly understood. Since search engines attract 
significant attention from users, studies of search engines are popular (Nielsen Study, 
1997; Ernst & Young, 1998; GVU, 1998; NetRatings, 1999; IMT Strategies, 2000), but 
they do not provide an understanding of the industry. This paper tries to understand the 
search engine market from a perspective that integrates technology, behavior, economics, 
social networks, and organizational theory. This enables a more comprehensive 
evaluation of whether or not search engines have monopoly power. The conduct and 
performance of search engine sites will be discussed. Since the Web is still in its early 
stage of development, understanding the technology and behavior of the Web can help 
policy makers determine the relevance of existing antitrust legislation to E-Commerce. 
 
1 Motivation: Microsoft Case 
Background Information and Debates: 
    The Department of Justice (DOJ), 20 state attorneys general, and the District of 
Columbia filed broad antitrust lawsuits against the Microsoft Corporation on May 18, 
1998, charging that Microsoft had illegally thwarted competition to protect and extend its 
monopoly over personal computing software. Essentially, the government contended that 
Microsoft was violating the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 by using its monopoly of 
Windows 95 to dominate the Internet browser market6.  
    As Microsoft’s conduct was somewhat different from standard antitrust behavior 
with respect to monopoly and anticompetitive activities, it became a controversial 
question whether Microsoft was involved with antitrust issues. The pros and cons of 
antitrust action against Microsoft (Spaulding, 2000; Thierer, 1997; the Chicago Tribune, 
1997) in terms of the key issues of monopoly power, price, quality, innovation, and 
competition are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1: The Pros and Cons of Debates in Microsoft case 
 Pros (Not Antitrust) Cons (Yes-Antitrust) 
Monopoly 
Power 
In 1997, Microsoft only accounted for less 
than 2% of the entire computer hardware 
and software industry, 4% of the software 
industry, and 36% of the browser market. 
Microsoft dominates 90% of the Operating 
Systems (OS) market. This gives it a natural 
monopoly due to network effects in the 
software industry. The marginal cost of 
software is near zero. Microsoft has 
established a huge installed base that gives 
Microsoft power to price.  
Price Predatory pricing of software is 
impossible because competition drives 
costs to slightly above marginal cost, and 
since the marginal cost of software is nil, 
it’s impossible to price below cost. 
According to this, Microsoft was just 
selling Internet Explorer (IE) at marginal 
cost. Also the theme that Microsoft would 
raise the price of IE after it drove all its 
competitors is based on traditional 
antitrust theory and will not happen 
because new competitors will likely enter 
the market.  
Microsoft used predatory pricing to establish 
its monopoly power in the browser market. If 
the marginal cost of IE is nil, the marginal cost 
of all software should be nil. The reason why 
IE is free and other software (including 
operating systems) is so expensive is that IE 
faces real competition while Microsoft has 
already monopolized markets in other areas. 
 
Quality Microsoft keeps improving its products. 
The functions of the latest version of IE 
are much better than its initial versions. 
Microsoft developed the most desirable 
product and continues to build on its 
success with innovation and imagination. 
Microsoft rarely produces best software in the 
beginning. Their software might be considered 
good because users don’t see any other 
products. IE might be better than Netscape 
now. That is because Microsoft spends money 
made from its other monopoly markets on 
developing IE and gives it away for free. 
Netscape can’t make money after Microsoft’s 
competition resulting in poor R&D 
development. 
Innovation Microsoft keeps innovating. The tying of 
IE with the OS is evidence that Microsoft 
can offer better functions by integrating 
the two products together. 
Once Microsoft monopolizes the browser 
market, it will be able to set the standard and 
develop proprietary technologies, hindering 
innovation by other companies. 
Competition The AOL-Netscape merger will give 
Microsoft more competition. 
Not really. Microsoft isn’t charging for IE 
separately. AOL-Netscape won’t be able to 
affect Microsoft’s monopoly positions in its 
markets for OS, Office, and so on.  
     
    The Microsoft case illustrates that in IT industries the case for and against 
monopolistic practices is somewhat different than in non-IT industries. Microsoft had a 
monopoly (90% of market share in the Operating System market), high production 
differentiation (hard to find similar products), and there was a high entry barrier. In 
addition, Microsoft was involved with many computer manufacturers and Internet 
service/content providers and had forced them to conduct anticompetitive acts.  
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    Microsoft’s network position in the IT industry is in fact similar to that of other 
organizations that have been involved in antitrust suits. Chowdhury (1998) examined 
change in the inter-organizational network within the IT industries from 1989 to 1997. He 
found that the 4 companies with the highest degree of centrality (largest number of 
connections7 to other companies) were AT&T, IBM, Microsoft, and Time Warner. All 
four have been involved with antitrust issues. Chowdhury found that after 1993 Microsoft 
dramatically increased the number of other organizations with which it was allied (i.e., 
the degree of centrality increased). This was correlated with Microsoft’s growth on other 
fronts and its increase in market share. Indicators based on analyses of the 
inter-organizational network structure and the market economy support the claim that 
Microsoft had monopolistic power. The search engine industry is another IT industry.  
Will we see a similar pattern of behavior to that observed in the Microsoft case?   
 
2 Research Model 
    A standard approach to analyze markets used by Industrial Organization 
Economists (Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, 1995) is the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) model (Figure 1 – non-shaded portion). This 
model provides a framework for organizing and discussing the important concepts of 
markets. Implicitly, this model assumes that connections among organizations are 
irrelevant, and that organizations are independent actors. 
    A complementary approach has been taken by organizational theorists, who argue 
that organizations are not independent; rather, the market is a social network (e.g. White, 
1981a, 1981b; Baker, 1984a, 1984b; Faulkner, 1983). Further, this inter-organizational 
network affects the performance of organizations and their ability to constrain and enable 
the deployment of new products and the entry of new organizations (Burt, 1982; Leifer 
and White, 1987).   
Figure 1: Standard SCP model (unshaded) and Extended Model (shaded) 
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    Baker (1987) further argued that when this inter-organizational network was 
differentiated into a core and periphery structure, there was an unequal distribution of 
power. Such core-periphery structures are another potential indicator of monopolistic 
control or collusion. Core actors would have a much higher degree of centrality than 
non-core actors. 
    If core actors control important resources in the economy, they possess the means 
to control economic decisions (Parsions and Smelser, 1956). Core actors tend to be more 
profitable (Burt, 1983). Social network relationships not only help firms control resources 
in order to affect economic decisions, but also help firms overcome the uncertainty and 
distrust that often plague market exchange (Granovetter, 1985). Interconnection among 
firms facilitates the flow of resources and information, but also increases the possibility 
that firms who are connected as a subnetwork pursue their interests, such as increasing 
price, reducing competition, deterring new entrants, etc. Taking these inter-organizational 
networks into account leads to an extension of the SCP model as shown in Figure 1 with 
the addition of the shaded box.  
 
3 Preliminary Investigation of Search Engines 
3.1 Definition of the Market of Major Search Engines  
     Although there are several types of search engines8, in this paper, we focus on the 
major search engines that provide general search services. We assume that the top 19 
search engines9 in the June 2000 rating from Nielsen/NetRatings account for 100 % 
market share. The reasons are (1) the top 19 search engines listed by Nielsen/NetRatings 
have gained significant audience reach (at least 0.1 %) and are used by most people; (2) 
the engines outside the top 19 either have insignificant market share (less than 0.1 % of 
audience reach) or are not considered a search engine by Nielsen/NetRatings. This 
selection of 19 organizations that come from Nielsen/NetRatings to do a market analysis 
may overstate the case for monopolistic effects as it does not include AOL10, which is an 
Internet Service Provider website that also provides search service.   
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3.2 Characteristics of Search Engine Market  
3.2.1 Search Techniques
 
    Due to the fast growth of the Web and limitations of indexing and crawling 
techniques, none of the available search techniques can thoroughly cover the whole Web. 
Each technique has its own advantage and disadvantage11. Generally speaking, search 
techniques fall into five categories: 
Human Editing 
    Yahoo is the best-known site in this category. Yahoo has more than 150 editors to 
screen and categorize URLs submitted by their owners. Yahoo emphasizes to their users 
that their editors review every URL in their directory. Another kind of human editing is 
question-based. AskJeeves, for example, also hires editors to edit web pages as answers 
to user questions. 
Crawler 
    AltaVista and Google are examples of crawler search engines. Crawler search 
engines use software to create a database12. Although technical concepts behind these 
crawler search engines are similar, they can use very different search methodologies and 
algorithms to decide relevancy and ranking of search results. So far none of the crawler 
search engines can cover the whole Web. Even Google, which claimed to have a biggest 
indexed database, only covered half of the web as of June 2000. The reasons are (1) the 
scope of the Web is growing faster than the batch process in which search techniques can 
crawl; (2) some domains are proprietary and reluctant to be searched; (3) some search 
engines only search web pages in specific languages. 
Popularity  
    DirectHit is widely known for its popularity methodology. DirectHit collects data 
about what people click on when search results are provided to them from the DirectHit 
and HotBot sites. The database is updated periodically. The more people click on a site, 
the higher ranking that web site is given.  
Commercial 
    Goto is one of the “Commercial” search engines. How sites are ranked as a result of 
a search is based on how much they pay for each click. The basic concept is similar to the 
yellow pages. Commercial search engines believe that the more web sites pay for each 
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click, the better the quality of the web sites. Therefore, when users click on higher ranked 
web sites, they presumably visit higher quality web sites.  
Hybrid 
    Some search engines employ hybrid search techniques13 in an attempt to increase 
coverage. Some search engines provide second opinions from other search engines 
following their initial results.  
3.2.2 Network Structure of Search Engines 
    So far, none of the search techniques employed by the search organizations can 
adequately cover the whole web. Thus, interconnection of search engines sites is one way 
to increase coverage. Many search engines provide hyperlinks pointing to other search 
engines (Figure 2), though others, such as MSN and iWon, don’t. When users click on 
those hyperlinks, users are automatically taken to those search engines to get the results 
of their search without inputting keywords again. These hyperlinks create a network of 
search engines. The power that sites have over the flow of information is a function of the 
site’s position in this network. Network centrality, both degree and betweenness have 
been used as indicators of power.  
Figure 2: Hyperlinks on Yahoo’s search result pages 
 
 
 
 
     
    
 
    Network analysis is a methodology that uses nodes and lines to map relationships 
of actors. Wasserman and Faust (1994) stated that the network perspective has proved 
fruitful in a wide range of social and behavioral science disciplines. A network is 
composed of nodes and relations. For our purposes, the nodes are search engine web sites. 
Relations are the hyperlinks, the channels for transfer or “ flow” of resources (either 
material or nonmaterial). Nodes vary in their centrality. We use three measures of 
centrality – degree, betweenness, and information. The most commonly used measure of 
Source: Yahoo’s web page of search results, Nov. 19, 2000 
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centrality is degree, the number of other nodes the node in question is connected to.  
Degree can be separated into indegree (the number of other search engines that connect to 
the engine in question) and outdegree (the number of other search engines to which the 
engine in question connects to).  
     Betweenness and information are also used to measure node centrality. Freeman 
(1979) uses betweenness centrality14 to measure the extent to which a particular node 
lies “between” the various other nodes in the graph: a point of relatively low degree may 
play an important “intermediary” role and so be very central to the network (Scott, 1991). 
Information centrality15 measures the information contained in all paths originating with 
a specific node. The information of a node averages the information in these paths, which, 
in turn is inversely related to the variance in the transmission of a signal from a node to 
another (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
     We collected data on the hyperlinks connecting search engine web sites over a 
five-month period from August 12th 2000 to Dec. 12th 2000. Each month’s network was 
stored as a binary matrix. For example, when Yahoo places a hyperlink leading to 
AltaVista16, then 1 is recorded in cell defined by the Yahoo row and AltaVista column. 
Otherwise, 0 is recorded. The data collected from August 12th to Dec. 12th were recorded 
in five matrixes. 
    We checked the 19 search engines listed in the rating from Nielsen/NetRatings in 
June, 2000. At each site, we used four types of keywords, including “travel” (popular 
word) “Citibank” (company name) “Tair-Rong Sheu” (unusual name), and “fdkhgugn” 
(meaningless word). Then we recorded the hyperlinks pointing to the other search 
engines that are in the top 19 list. 
    The network structure17 of the search engines on August 12th, 2000 is shown 
graphically in Figure 3. The direction of the arrow indicates who links to whom. 
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Figure 3: Network Structure of Search Engines on August 12th, 2000 
 
    Table 2 summarizes the way in which average centrality changes over time18. The 
degree of centrality has increased on average from August to December, although the 
trend is not monotonic. This increase is a sign of network structuration – the maturation 
and development of a stable network of relations that control an industry. There is also a 
fairly high degree of variance, regardless of the centrality measure used. This indicates 
that there is an unequal distribution of power in this industry. 
Table 2: Change in Average Centrality in the Search Engine Network 
Date of data collection Aug. 12th Sep. 12th Oct. 12th Nov. 12th Dec. 12th 
Mean of Indegree (Stdev*) 1.84(1.60) 2.26(1.89) 2.05(1.73) 2.11(1.74) 2.32(1.72) 
Mean of Outdegree (Stdev) 1.84(2.32) 2.26(2.69) 2.05(2.63) 2.11(2.67) 2.32(2.75) 
Mean of nBetweenness (Stdev) 0.96(1.80) 1.08(1.75) 0.83(1.49) 0.76(1.37) 1.50(2.41) 
Mean of Information Centrality (Stdev) 0.44(0.14) 0.51(0.16) 0.48(0.15) 0.48(0.15) 0.49(0.16) 
 
     
Density 0.102(0.303) 0.126(0.332) 0.114(0.318) 0.117(0.321) 0.129(0.335) 
Sample size 19 19 19 19 19 
*: Stdev: Standard Deviation. Others apply. 
    We compare the node behaviors of the top 4 search engines (Yahoo, MSN, Go, 
Netscape, decided by their audience reach) to all other engines (see Figure 4). The top 4 
sites have lower indegree and higher outdegree than do the other sites. In other words, 
these 4 sites dominate in terms of directing users where to look for information, both 
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directly and indirectly. During the five-month period, Yahoo and Netscape have an 
average outdegree of 5.2 and 6.4, respectively, but MSN and Go (Infoseek) have none. 
This reflects two different business strategies. Yahoo and Netscape have the most 
information power.  
Figure 4: The Indegree and Outdegree Trend of Top 4 v.s. All Others (15) 
    The top 4 sites with the highest centrality for each network measure are shown in 
Table 3. As we saw in the case of Microsoft, both a highly central network position and 
market share (audience reach) are needed to exert monopolistic influence. The 
network-based approach suggests a somewhat different view of power than does the 
audience reach measure. Yahoo is among the top 4 sites on all measures. Thus, from both 
a network position and an audience reach position, Yahoo has the potential to have the 
most monopolistic influence. MSN and Go, although high in audience reach, have no 
centrality. If resource based competition enables monopolistic power, then there may also 
be antitrust issues surrounding MSN. Table 3 also shows that some search engines (e.g. 
Alta Vista, Google) have highly central network positions but their audience reach are not 
among top 4. The longitudinal data of audience reach ranking after Aug. 2000 are needed 
to verify whether a central network position leads to high audience reach in the future. 
Table 3: Top 4 Sites Under Each Metric of Power Using August 2000 Data 
Indegree Outdegree Betweenness 
(normailzed) 
Information 
(normailzed) 
Audience Reach 
 in June 2000  
AltaVista(6) Open Directory(7) DirectHit(5.66) Yahoo(0.56) Yahoo(47%) 
Excite(4) Google(6) Yahoo(4.90) Google(0.56) MSN(35.8%) 
HotBot(4) Yahoo(6) AskJeeves(4.25) Alta Vista(0.55) Go(19.1%) 
Go,Lycos, 
Yahoo(3) 
Ask Jeeves, 
Snap(4) 
Alta Vista (1.96) Open Directory(0.55) Netscape(15.4%) 
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3.2.3 Standard Market Structure of Search Engines 
    Three additional concepts: concentration, product differentiation, and entry barriers, 
are used to describe the market structure of the search engines. These are important 
measures used by the Department of Justice to evaluate markets. We will later compare 
the characteristics of the search engine market to the criteria listed in 1992 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines19 and discuss policy implications. 
    The market structure analysis is conducted using the top 19 search engines20 listed 
by Nielsen/NetRatings. We make two assumptions: (1) the top 19 search engines account 
for 100 % of market shares21; (2) the market sales22 are linearly proportional to audience 
reach.  
    Nielsen//NetRatings has kept tracking the audience reach of top search engines for 
more than one year (Figure 5). There were 19 search engines on Nielsen//NetRatings as 
of June 2000, from the number one ranked Yahoo with 47 % of audience reach to the 
number nineteen Raging with 0.1 % of audience reach23.  
Figure 5: The Trend Comparison of Audience Reach of Search Engines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.searchenginewatch.com 
KEY: YH=Yahoo, MSN=MSN, GO=Go (Infoseek), NS=Netscape, LY=Lycos, AV=AltaVista, EX=Excite,  LS=LookSmart, 
SP=Snap, GT=GoTo, IW=iWon, GG=Google, HB=HotBot, AJ=AskJeeves, DH=Direct Hit, WC=WebCrawler, NL=Northern Light, 
ODP=Open Directory, RG=Raging Search 
 
Concentration 
    To determine concentration, three measures are used: the four-firm concentration 
ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and the Network Adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman 
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Index. 
z Four-firms concentration ratio (CR4) from Jul. 1999 to Jun., 2000 
    A concentration ratio is the most widely used index to measure concentration 
(Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, 1995). The four-firms concentration ratio reflects the 
share of total industry sales accounted for by the 4 largest firms. In order to calculate the 
total market share, the “market” has to be defined. It is necessary in practice to make 
difficult judgements about what products and firms constitute the market (Viscusi, Vernon, 
and Harrington, 1995). 
    Since we don’t have actual data of the advertising market sales, we define the 
search engine market share as follows: 
reachaudiencetotalofSummation
reachaudiencesi'engineSearch
 (Pi) sharemarketsi'engineSearch =  
    We calculate CR4 by taking the summation of the market shares of the top 4 search 
engines. The CR4 in each month is about 58% from Jul. 1999 to Jun. 200024. 
z Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
    HHI is an index used by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission in their 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The HHI has the advantage of 
incorporating more information showing the size distributions of firms than the 
concentration ratio does. HHI is defined as: 
∑
=
=
N
1i
HHI 2(100Pi)  
Pi is the firm i’s percentage of total industry sales (i.e., its market share), where N is the 
number of firms. The HHI ranges from 10,000 (a pure monopoly market) to a number 
close to zero (an atomistic market). 
    There are 19 search engines included in this calculation (N=19; Pi is defined above). 
The average HHI is 1163 over the period from Jul. 1999 to Jun. 200025. 
z Network Adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (NAHHI) 
    We propose to use NAHHI to evaluate the concentration of web sites. Hyperlinks 
placed on web pages form a network and facilitate users visiting from one site to another. 
Therefore, the market share (audience reach) of a site should incorporate the audience 
that may follow hyperlinks to visit it. If search engines are not connected to each other, 
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the NAHHI is equal to HHI. If search engines are connected to each other, users may 
follow those links to visit other search engines and become aware of and familiar with 
those search engines. NAHHI reflects potential market shares that search engines would 
acquire through interconnection and substitute information provided to users through 
hyperlinks. The higher the network density (interconnection), the lower the NAHHI. To 
calculate NAHHI, based on the indegree of search engines, we derive the “possible” 
audience reach (market share), which is the sum of its audience reach and the audience 
reach of those search engines that place a hyperlink pointing to it. Because users may 
visit more than one search engine (i.e., the total audience reach exceeds 100 %), we 
normalize the possible audience reach by taking the possible audience divided by the sum 
of the possible audience reach of the 19 search engines 26. The NAHHI for August 2000 
is 870, which is smaller than the HHI. The reason is that, after interconnecting to each 
other, the audience reach of search engines is more equally distributed. When the network 
effect is taken into account, there is less evidence for concentration. 
Product Differentiation 
    Users often start from search engines to explore other web pages. However, the 
frequency with which commercial web sites are visited is proportional to revenue. One 
strategy that search engines use to increase visits is to offer additional services such as 
free e-mail, news, chat, weather, etc. This differentiates their products. 
    In addition to search service, products that search engines offer often fall into three 
product categories: (1) Non-personalized features, such as News, Weather, Stock Quote, 
Map, etc. For these features, personal information is not required; (2) Personalized 
features, such as E-mail, Online Chat, Online Game, etc. With personalized features, sites 
can attract more users and lock them in (Telang, Mukhopadhyay, and Wilcox, 2000); (3) 
Platforms, such as online shopping, auctions, etc. Older search engines (Table 4) tend to 
offer products other than just search service. This increases users’ switching costs. The 
top 4 search engines tend to develop personal features (Table 5).  
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Table 4: Product Differentiation of Old and New Search Engines Using August 2000 
Data 
  Setup Dates Number of SE Non-persona
lized 
Features 
Personalized 
Features 
Platforms 
Old 1994-1997 
    % 
14 13 
93% 
12 
86% 
13 
93% 
Top 19 Search Engines 
New 1998-2000 
    % 
5 3 
60% 
4 
80% 
4 
80% 
 
Table 5: Product Differentiation of Top 4 and All Others 
 Number of SE Non-personalized 
Features 
Personalized 
Features 
Platforms 
Top 4 search engines 4 4 
100% 
4 
100% 
4 
100% 
Top 5-19 Search 
Engines 
15 12 
80% 
12 
80% 
13 
87% 
     
    Logistic regressions of the presence or absence of three different product features 
(1 = present, 0 = absent) onto the year of startup (1994-2000) show that the earlier the 
setup date of a search engine, the higher the probability of providing products other than 
search service that attract and lock in users (Table 6). 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Logistic Regressing Product Features onto Years of 
Setup 
 Non-personalized 
Features 
Personalized Features Platforms 
Chi-square p-value 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Odds ratio 0.35 0.43 0.50 
Maximum rescaled R2 0.48 0.38 0.30 
 
    The predicted probability curves of three different product features are shown in 
Figure 6-1 to 6-3. 
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Feature 6-2: The Personalized Features of Top 19 Search Engines by Setup Dates 
Feature 6-3: The Platforms of Top 19 Search Engines by Setup Dates  
 
Entry Barriers 
    The entry barrier of running a search engine is increasing over time due to the 
increasing size of the web, and increased switching costs resulted from products (e.g. 
e-mail) that lock in users. In the previous section, we observed that many search engines 
provide products that function to lock in users. Since we haven’t empirically examined 
the locking effect in this paper, in the following we provide a qualitative argument over 
entry barriers. 
z Web Size 
    From Dec.1999 to June 2000, the number of web pages has increased from 1 billion 
to 2 billion. By Jan. 2001, 4 billion web pages are expected. Each web page is estimated 
to have an average of 5.6 external links (Cyveillance report, 2000). Search techniques 
that rely on analysis of the pages (such as human editing) and those that rely on crawling 
among the links, have an increasingly hard job. In 2000, Yahoo had about 150 editors and 
Open Directory had more than 30,000 volunteers to edit their directories. As the number 
of sites increases, the number of human editors needed increases. For a new engine, all 
the current sites would need to be instantly indexed; whereas, existing engines only need 
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to make incremental changes. The dramatic growth of the web creates a barrier to entry. 
Buying a database from another search engine is one way of overcoming this barrier. 
However, rivalry search engine companies may jealously guard their databases.  
z Switching Costs 
    The revenues of search engines are mainly from two sources: advertising and 
electronic commerce. Both are positively proportional to the number of users. For new 
entrants, developing a large base of users takes time, a good product, and a lot of 
promotion expenses. The difficulty arises from high collective switching cost27 (Shapiro 
and Varian, 1998). Telang, Mukhopadhyay, and Wilcox (2000) showed that if users have 
used a particular search engine frequently in the past, they are much more likely to 
choose that search engine again in the future. Therefore, merging with an existing site 
with many users is a faster and cheaper alternative. Two merger cases showed that the 
average cost of acquiring an e-mail user28 in 1998 was $40 and the average cost of 
acquiring a hosted web site29 was $1000 in 1999. These investments are independent of 
search techniques. As previously noted, major search engines provide many features 
other than just search service. A new entrant has to overcome the challenge of providing 
competitive search service and has to add many features to attract users who have been 
locked in by current sites – which takes time. The longitudinal data (Figure 5) show that 
the top 2 sites, Yahoo and MSN, have continuously increased their audience reach while 
most other search engines have decreased. Although some new engines (e.g. iWon) 
entered the market, the CR4 over a year (note 24) is still not affected.  
    Figure 7 shows the distribution of the top 19 search engines by their setup dates. Of 
the top 19 search engines, 17 have been set up for two or more years. A simple regression 
on audience reach and years of setup shows that the earlier the setup date of a search 
HQJLQHWKHKLJKHUDXGLHQFHUHDFKS   
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Figure 7: The Audience Reach of Top 19 Search Engines by Setup Dates 
 
4 Policy Implications & Future Directions 
In this paper, we have tried to assess whether search engines have monopoly power 
by investigating the network structure and the market structure. In order to understand 
whether the structure of the search engine market is potentially problematic, we compare 
the characteristics of the search engine market to 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
(Table 7). These guidelines describe some analytical foundations of merger enforcement 
and provide guidance enabling the business community to avoid antitrust problems when 
planning mergers. 
Table 7: Comparison of Search Engine Market and 1992 Merger Guidelines 
1992 Merger Guidelines Search Engine Market 
Market Definition 19 major search engines that provide general search.  
Market Shares 
Sales or capacity of firms in the defined market 1. Audience Reach is assumed to be market shares; 
2. The audience reach of top 19 search engines is 
assumed to account for 100 % market share. 
Market Concentration 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
1. Unconcentrated: HHI below 1000; 
1. Moderately concentrated: HHI between 1000 and 
1800 
3. Highly concentrated: HHI above 1800. 
HHI: 1163 (in average from July 1999 to June 2000) 
CR4: 58% (in average from July 1999 to June 2000) 
NAHHI: 870 (in Aug. 2000) 
Entry 
1. Timely: Whether entry can achieve significant 
market impact within a timely period 
2. Likely: Whether entry can be a profitable, hence, 
a likely response to a merger having competitive 
effects of concern. 
3. Sufficient: Whether timely and likely entry would 
be sufficient to return market prices to their 
premerger levels. 
1. Among top 19 search engines, 17 search engines are 
older than 2 years. 
2. iWon entered into this market in Oct. 1999 and 
achieved 6.7% of audience reach in June, 2000, 
ranked as 11th. 
3. Search engines don’t charge users. However, price 
for advertising may be an indicator to measure 
competition but not studied in this paper.  
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    According to the guidelines, the search engine market is moderately concentrated 
based on the HHI. If there were any merger that would cause HHI to increase more than 
100 points, then the merger would raise significant competitive concerns30 and need 
further investigation. In Figure 8, the gray cells indicate that there are 29 possible mergers 
that could result in HHI increasing by more than 100 points. 
Figure 8: Possible Mergers Producing an Increase in the HHI* of More Than 100 points 
 Rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 SE YH MSN GO NS LY AV EX LS  SP GT IW 
1 YH            
2 MSN 1131           
3 GO 519 418          
4 NS 395 315 192         
5 LY 395 315 192 163        
6 AV 307 244 145 122 122       
7 EX 336 267 160 135 135 116      
8 LS 195 153          
9 SP 192 150          
10 GT 166 130          
11 IW 163 127          
*: The HHI calculation is based on the audience reach data in Jun. 2000. 
    However, the market would be considered unconcentrated if NAHHI were taken 
into account. It shows that interconnection of search engines reduces the possibility of 
getting a concentrated market because audience reach may be more equally distributed 
through interconnection.  Since the search engine industry is concerned with the flow of 
information among sites, the NAHHI may provide a more accurate reflection of actual 
concentration. 
    The statistical data of the top 19 search engines show that in most cases, the date of 
setup is critical to success. However, some new engines (e.g. iWon), with special 
promotion, can still achieve high audience reach in a short time. Therefore, new entrants 
may still affect markets and prevent anticompetition. Whether this will continue to be the 
case as the exponential growth of the web continues remains to be seen. 
    Several conducts of search engines are relevant to the investigation of 
anticompetition: 
z Search engines don’t charge users but advertisers. 
Search engines provide free search services to users but make money by selling web 
spaces to advertisers. Therefore, advertising sales and prices are relevant to evaluate 
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monopoly power of search engines so as to assess social welfare. Unfortunately at this 
point, data on advertising sales are difficult to collect from public sources because not 
every search engine is listed on the stock market. 
z Some search engines don’t connect to other search engines. 
    According to the study of network structure, we found that 17 of the 19 search 
engines connect to other search engines. We also found that the interconnection of search 
engines has an upward trend. However, some search engines such as MSN and iWon 
don’t connect to any other search engines. 
z Some search engines are supported by giant parent companies and may be 
involved with product bundling31. 
    It is well known that Microsoft bundled the IE browser with its OS and therefore 
was alleged to be anticompetitive. Based on my study, we find similar situations (e.g., 
Microsoft bundles its IE browser with its MSN web site) If, with the help from other 
monopoly markets, those web sites gain monopoly powers in the search engine market, 
they would be able to charge advertisers higher price and might even be able to charge 
users search services. They might also reduce the diversity of product offered once they 
no longer face strong competition. Such activities could cause a loss of social welfare. 
    Besides conduct, performance evaluation is also a critical factor in the SCP model. 
Quality of search techniques may be used to evaluate performance of search engines 
whose core service is search, in terms of ranking and relevancy of search results. The 
quality of ranking and relevancy is inversely proportional to “information search cost”, 
the cost of looking for information. Therefore, further research could investigate 
“information search cost” as a performance indicator of search techniques. This indicator 
becomes very important when the amount of information on the Web skyrockets to a 
degree that makes it difficult decide ranking and relevancy of search results. The situation 
may be even worse when ranking and relevancy of search results are not decided based on 
impartial algorithms32. As this began to happen, could users know and would they switch 
to other search engines? Telang, Mukhopadhyay, and Wilcox (2000) showed that users 
are likely to continue to use the same search engine that they have frequently used in the 
past. They also show that users have more loyalty to a search engine in which they use 
more personalized features. If search engines keep working on locking in users without 
improving search techniques or algorithms, this could pose a serious problem. Only a few 
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search engines might exist, providing lower quality and less impartial service than is 
technically feasible. 
 
5 Conclusion 
    E-Commerce challenges traditional approaches to assessing monopolistic practices 
due to the rapid rate of growth, rapid change in technology, difficulty in assessing market 
share for information products like web sites, and high degree of interconnectivity and 
alliance formation among corporations. This paper has provided a fundamental 
framework that integrates an economic and network perspective to understand IT markets. 
Additional work needs to be done to integrate these perspectives and to exam other types 
of alliance structures and resources. In the future, research is needed on the information 
search cost of search engines and on technological progress in the information technology 
industries.  
    This framework was applied to the search engine market. We study critical 
characteristics of the search engine market, including major players, search techniques, 
network structure, and market structure and try to assess whether any search engines have 
monopoly power given that advertising price in the search engine market is not easily 
attained and that no price is charged from users for most services provided by search 
engines. If any anticompetition is alleged in the search engine market, the research 
findings of this paper will be relevant. The findings indicate that (1) despite an increasing 
number of search engines, barriers to entry seem high, largely due to the exponential 
growth in the number of web sites and the non-scalability of the current search 
technology, and collective switching costs; (2) older search engine sites tend typically to 
have more features and so greater ability to lock in users. In fact, most users rarely use 
more than two sites in a single search session. Using standard economic indicators 
(CR4=58% and HHI=1163), the industry looks close to being plagued by anticompetitive 
practices. However, the nature of the industry and the relevant technology is such that the 
web of connection and alliances among search engines is highly critical both to the 
product being delivered and the way in which business is conducted. Thus, we 
constructed a network adjusted HHI (NAHHI) and its value was only 870, suggesting that 
there is less cause for concern.  
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    To date, no search techniques are able to cover the whole web. Estimates suggest 
that the most comprehensive search engines are covering less than half of the sites in 
2000. The number of sites is increasing faster than the number of sites searched. If this 
continues, and if the number of search engines decreases, then likely results are 
information distortion, loss of social welfare, and loss of economic value for sites not 
covered by the search engines. If there were to be only a few search engine sites, who are 
they likely to be? This analysis suggests that Yahoo would be a contender. It ranks high 
on all indicators and it is an old site, offering a variety of services, with a powerful 
network position and high audience reach. Other possible contenders are MSN and 
Netscape. On the basis of results to date, some search engines keep increasing their 
audience reach while others don’t. The trend shows that some search engines may 
dominate the search engine market. We suggest conducting research in the coverage 
performance of search engines and investigate “information search cost” as a 
performance indicator of search techniques. In addition, we suggest paying attention to 
any anticompetitive conduct (e.g. product bundling) that may lesson competition and 
reduce consumer welfare. The combination of network theory and economic theory to 
study the search engine market used in this paper is a particularly powerful approach for 
E-Commerce. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 The following figure was in Cyveillance Press, July 10, 2000 
http://www.cyveillance.com/newsroom/pressr/000710.asp 
 
 
2
 The top10 web groups from MediaMetrix survey as of June, 2000 were (1) AOL 
Network; (2) Microsoft Sites; (3) Yahoo Sites; (4) Lycos; (5) Excite; (6) Go Network; (7) 
About.com Sites; (8) AltaVista Network; (9) NBC Internet; (10) Amazon. Except 
Amazon, the other web sites all provide general search services. The data source is from 
http://us.mediametrix.com/press/releases/20000720a.jsp. 
 
3
 Nielsen//NetRatings uses software to monitor a panel of web surfers, a sample of about 
43,000 at home users. The estimate of audience reach is the percentage of active web 
surfers estimated to have visited each search engine during the month. The data source is 
from www.searchenginewatch.com. 
The top19 search engines surveyed by Nielsen/NetRatings in June, 2000 are shown as 
follows: 
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4
 Audience reach, a measure used in Nielsen//NetRatings, is presented as the percentage 
of active web surfers estimated to have visited search engines in the survey month. One 
person may visit a web site several times in a given period. Thus, the number of audience 
reach is typically smaller than the number of hits.   
 
5
 The combined total percentages exceed 100 % because a web surfer may visit more 
than one search engine. 
 
6
 Microsoft Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator are two major browsers in this 
market. 
 
7
 The alliances in Chowdhury’s research (1998) were defined as (1) merger; (2) 
acquisition; (3) asset purchase; (4) joint venture, joint ownership; (5) minority stake; (6) 
marketing or distribution alliance; (7) licensing deal; (8) supply agreement; (9) R&D 
partnership; (1) asset swapping; (11) partnership; (12) unclassified agreement or 
partnership. 
 
8
 Some search engines that provide general search service may not be selected in my 
data set. The reason is that they have too little audience reach to be found by casual users 
and thus to have market power. We either don’t include Metacrawlers, such as search.com 
or mamma.com, because they don’t have their own directory or database. They only send 
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keywords to other search engines and get results back to users. 
 
9
 Please see note5. 
 
10
 AOL is not listed in the top 19 search engines by Nielsen/NetRatings. Whether AOL 
is considered a search engine is controversial since providing Internet access is its core 
business. However, its subscribers may perform search through its search function. 
Therefore, the assumption of that the top19 search engines account for 100 % of market 
shares may be distorted when AOL is considered a search engine and the cross-elasticity 
demand between AOL and other search engines is high. 
 
11
 The advantages and disadvantages of different search techniques are shown as 
follows: 
Search Techniques Advantage Disadvantage 
Human Editing A great amount of information is 
processed by editors and is put into related 
categories. 
The amount of information is often 
growing faster than limited editors can 
handle. 
Crawler The coverage rate is better than can be 
reached by human editing. 
The ranking and relevancy of search 
results are difficult to decide for such large 
amounts of information. 
Popularity “Hot sites” that attract many people’s 
attention are ranked higher. 
Some unpopular sites that could be useful 
to users would never receive a high 
ranking. 
Commercial Users might find sites that pay more for 
each click match their search better. 
Some web sites that don’t pay and are 
highly related to users’ search will never 
show up on top. 
 
12
 A crawler search engine mainly has three parts; (1) A spider (also called a "crawler" 
or a "bot") that follows hypertext links to read every page or representative pages on 
every web site that wants to be searchable; (2) A program that creates a huge index 
(sometimes called a "catalog") from the pages that have been read; (3) A program that 
receives a user’s search request, compares it to the entries in the index, and returns results 
to the user. (whatis.com). 
 
13
 For example, Yahoo gives search results from its own directory first. If it can not find 
any matching from its directory, it will provide search results from Google, a crawler 
search engine. 
 
14
 Please see Wasserman and Faust (1994), p.188. 
 
15
 Please see Wasserman and Faust (1994), p.192. 
 
16
  The following matrix contains the data of interconnection among search engines in 
August 2000. An entry of 1 indicates that the search engine indicated by the row is linked 
to the one indicated by the column. For example, Alta Vista had a link to number 10 
(Look Smart). Ask Jeeves had a link to number 4 (Excite).  
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 AltaVista 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 AskJeeves 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
3 DirectHit 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Excite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Google 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
6 GoTo.com 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 HotBot 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 Infoseek 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 iwon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 LookSmart 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 Lycos 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 MSN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 Netscape 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 NorthernLig
ht 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 OpenDirecto
ry 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
16 raging 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 Snap 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
18 WebCrawler 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 Yahoo 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
17
 The figure was generated with the software package KrackPlot. 
 
18
 We used UCINET, a quantitative software analyzing sociomatrix, to analyze the five 
sets of matrix data. 
 
19
 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines were jointly issued by The U.S. Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission.  
 
20
 iWon came into the rating in Oct. 1999 and Raging, came into the rating in May, 2000.  
The other 17 search engines were on the rating throughout the survey period. 
 
21
 Based on rating of audience reach of search engines from Nielsen/NetRatings in June, 
2000. AOL is not included in my sample because it is not listed by Nielsen/NetRatings 
and it is often considered an ISP company. However, it also provides search service. 
Therefore, the assumption of that top19 search engines account for 100 % of market 
shares may be distorted. 
 
22
 The major revenue of search engines comes from advertising sales and is proportional 
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to their audience reach. The more search engine users visit their sponsor web sites, the 
more revenue the search engines make. Although advertising sales might be used to 
calculate market shares more accurately, it is difficult in practice to collect this data 
because most web sites do not release this information. Therefore, we assume the 
percentage of audience reach is proportional to the percentage of market sales. 
 
23
 Please see note3. 
 
24
 The trend of concentration ratio is shown as follows: 
The Trend of Concentration Ratio
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 The Trend of HHI is shown as follows: 
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 The calculation of the NAHHI for August 2000 is listed as follows: 
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The indegree data were from Aug. 2000 while the audience reach data were from Jun. 
2000 (please see note3). We made an assumption that the audience reach of the search 
engine i and those search engines that connects to it have 30 % overlap, which means 30 
% of their visitors are the same. Based on this assumption, the NAHHI is 870, which 
indicates an unconcentrated market. In order to reduce the bias of this assumption, we ran 
a sensitivity analysis varying overlapping rate from 0% to 90%. The NAHHI doesn’t 
change much, still showing an unconcentrated market. 
Overlapping Rate v.s. NAHHI
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Overlapping Rate
N
A
H
H
Overlapping
 
 
27
 Shapiro and Varian (1998) stated that collective switching cost, the combined 
switching costs of all users, is a challenge to companies to attract users to a new network. 
Collective switching costs work in a nonlinear way: convincing ten people in a network 
to switch to a new network is more than ten times as hard as getting one user to switch. 
The worst problem is that no one wants to be the first to give up the network externality 
and risk being stranded. 
 
28
 Microsoft in 1998 spent $400 million buying Hotmail, which was a web site providing 
free e-mail and had 10 million members as of Jan. 1998. The average cost of getting a 
member was $40. 
 
29
 Yahoo in 1999 spent $3.5 billion buying Geocities, which was a web site providing 
free space for publishing web pages and had 3.5 million web sites hosted under it as of 
Jan. 1999. 
 
30
 In the search engine market, CR4 and HHI were 58% and 1183 as of Jun. 2000. 
According to 1992 Merger Guidelines, this market is moderately concentrated. When 
there is a merger producing an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points, post-merger 
potentially raise significant competitive concerns.  
 
31
 The following table shows the examples of search engines that are bundled with other 
products or services from the same parent companies. 
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Search 
Engine 
Parent 
Company 
Product Bundling 
MSN Microsoft The default homepage of IE either links to MSN web site or has a hyperlink pointing to 
MSN web site. It is estimated that IE dominates 75% of the browser market. Every 
time when IE is activated, it will show MSN web site unless users change the default 
web page(more than 60% of users don’t change the default homepage.) and MSN site 
will gain one hit. 
 
32
 For example, some search engines have presented their sponsors’ web sites on the top 
of search result pages. Users are led to the information that have been selected based on 
commercial interests. 
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